Boko Haram insurgency and the necessity for trans-territorial forestland governance in the Lower Lake Chad Basin by Okoli, Al Chukwuma
37
Yonas Adaye Adeto
Boko Haram insurgency and the 
necessity for trans-territorial 




The significance of forests as an existential threat to national security 
in Nigeria has been underscored in the phenomenon of Boko Haram 
insurgency. The occupation and apparent ‘weaponisation’ of Sambisa and 
the adjoining forests by Boko Haram insurgents have continued to pose 
an enervating tactical challenge that complicates the ongoing counter-
insurgency efforts in northeast Nigeria. The instrumentalisation of forests 
as an operational and defensive stronghold by the insurgents in the lower 
Lake Chad Basin has been enabled by the existence of large expanses of 
dispersed, uninhabited and un-policed forested spheres in the area. This 
study examines the imperative for transnational forestland governance 
in the lower Lake Chad Basin, in the light of a continual incidence of 
Boko Haram insurgency in that context. Drawing discursively from the 
‘ungoverned spaces’ (territorial ungovernability) hypothesis, the study 
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posits that the prevailing vacuum of effective forestland governance in the 
region must be filled in order to mitigate the security challenge. To that 
end, the study prescribes a strategic trans-territorial forestland governance 
regime whereby Nigeria and Cameroon synergise efforts in bringing about 
effective reclamation and occupation of the volatile forested landscapes.
Keywords: Boko Haram, forest, forest governance, insurgency, lower Lake 
Chad Basin
1. Introduction
Armed conf licts in Africa are systemic and opportunistic. More often 
than not, they have been symptomatic of structural misalignments within 
the state or the economy. But more fundamentally, the conf licts have had 
the tendency to complicate matters and prolong themselves by exploiting 
extant socio-ecological and political faultlines. A veritable and critical 
instance of such faultlines is the pockets of ‘ungoverned spheres’ that dot 
the continent’s territorial domains and frontiers. By ‘ungoverned sphere’ 
is meant an area within the territorial domain of a state that is lacking 
or grossly deficient in governmental presence and control. Ungoverned 
spheres are, nonetheless, not absolutely anarchic. In effect, they are often 
ruled by illicit non-state authorities with criminal or treasonable political 
agendas. Typifying this territorial category is the phenomenon of forest.
Forest has been a topical subject of academic and policy research. 
Existing studies in this regard however, have been skewed towards bio-
ecological, agricultural and environmental studies (Food and Agricultural 
Organisation [FAO] 2011; International Tropical Timber Organisation 
[ITTO] and FAO 2009). In this respect, the emphasis has variously been 
on forest as a veritable site for ecological conservation, eco-tourism 
and recreation, as well as rural livelihood. The existing literature on 
environmental health recognises the forest as a veritable existential health 
hazard (ITTO and FAO 2009). Beyond this, only little has been done in 
terms of systematic studies underscoring the significance of forest as 
a crucial national security problematic. In the view of Albert (2017:5), 
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‘Though strategically important, not many academic works exist on the 
physical security implications of (African) forests’. In effect, scholarship 
in this area of study is still nascent and emerging, with scholars such as 
Ladan (2014), Okoli and Ochim (2016), Albert (2017), and Olaniyan 
(2018) as seminal contributors. The present study intends to build upon 
these studies, with an analytical departure that privileges the strategic 
importance of forest vis-à-vis Nigeria national security.
In a nutshell, previous presentations in the ongoing conference have tended 
to approach the theme from either a socio-ecological or an economic 
perspective. However, this presentation deals with the politico-strategic 
dimension of the subject matter. It probes the accompanying effects and 
strategic implications of the occupation of Sambisa forest in the lower Lake 
Chad Basin by Boko Haram insurgents. The exigency of trans-territorial 
forestland governance is then highlighted. 
The paper is a product of a desk-study, drawing from library and online 
resources. It is an exploratory analysis of the threat potential of forests in 
Africa through the vantage prism of the ongoing Boko Haram insurgency 
in northeast Nigeria, within the wider remit of the lower Lake Chad 
Basin. The study problematises forests as a crucial existential threat to 
national and regional security and logically underscores the necessity 
for a contingency transnational forest governance approach as the way 
forward. Aligning its analytical perspective to the theory of ungoverned 
spaces, the study underscores the strategic implication of the scarcely or 
poorly governed Sambisa forest in the context of insurgency and counter-
insurgency, with the submission that the virtual ungovernability of the 
forest has provided operational incentive and advantage to the insurgents, 
in addition to inhibiting the efficacy of the ongoing counter-insurgency 
operations. It is expected that the outcome of the study would contribute to 
motivating and edifying future research endeavours on the relevant aspects 
of the subject matter.
The remainder of the paper is organised in eight thematic sections. 
Following this introductory section is one on conceptual clarifications 
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in which the concepts of insurgency, forest, and forest governance are 
considered with the intent to clarifying and situating their operational 
meanings. This is followed by the theoretical framework whereby the 
‘ungoverned spaces’ thesis is appropriated as an analytical anchor for the 
study. Next is a brief literature review on the connections between forests 
and insurgency, geared towards predicating the study on the theories and 
results now available from our extant corpus of knowledge. Following 
this section is an attempt to highlight the strategic utility of forest 
ecology from the standpoint of the varying uses and abuses of forests in 
different contexts. Then there is an overview of the setting and contextual 
background to the study. This is followed by an examination of Boko 
Haram’s occupation and exploitation of the Sambisa forests. Heralding 
the conclusion is a section on the imperative for governing the Sambisa 
forest through a trans-territorial approach involving the strategic synergy 
between the governments of Nigeria and Cameroon. The final section is a 
conclusion, which summarises the developed argument.
2. Clarification of terms
Five basic descriptive terms constitute and motivate the content of this 
study. These are: insurgency, forest, ungoverned space, forest governance 
and Boko Haram insurgency. This section clarifies their meanings, 
provides situational contexts for each and points out how they are used to 
conceptualise the problems and solutions.
2.1 Insurgency
This refers to the systematic use of subversion and violence to seize, 
nullify, or challenge political control of a region. By its peculiar nature, 
insurgency is a pattern of asymmetric violence. In effect, it involves the 
use of a combination of subversion, sabotage, guerrilla tactics, and sundry 
extremist machinations in a bid to attain a politically amenable objective 
(cf. Otegwu 2015; Albert 2017).
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2.2 Forest/Forestland
A forest is a plant community consisting predominantly of trees and 
a variety of woody vegetation, which occupies an extensive area of land 
(Ladan 2014; Okoli and Ochim 2016). Depending on the geographical 
characteristics of its environment, a forest can be classified as, for instance, 
a tropical forest, rainforest, savanna forest or swamp forest. Generally, there 
are two types of forest regime, namely wild-woods and protected forests. 
Regarding this typology, Okoli and Ochim (2016:45–46) succinctly opine 
that ‘Wild-woods are naturally growing forests that are open to primitive 
and unregulated exploitation while protected forests are wood-lands 
controlled and regulated by the government’. Forests are characterised by 
difficult terrain, exemplified in rough and rugged landscape as well as thick 
and crowded foliage (Olaniyan 2018:1). Some of the common features of a 
typical forest are woods, jungles, creeks, caves, swamps and wild animals. 
2.3 Ungoverned space
An ungoverned space refers to a territorial sphere where firm governmental 
control is lacking. It is ‘a physical or non-physical area where there is an absence 
of state capacity or political will to exercise control’ (Whelan 2006:65). 
This may include land areas, maritime spheres and cyberspace domains, where 
state control is grossly deficient or absent. Such a scenario often gives room 
for illicit and subversive activities by criminal or extremist elements.
2.4 Forest governance
This refers to ‘the modus operandi by which officials and institutions 
acquire and exercise authority in the management of forest resources’ 
(ITTO and FAO 2009:5). Contemporary forest governance emphasises issues 
that are critical to the safety, security and sustainability of forests (Yale 
School of Forest and Environmental Studies n.d.). This includes measures 
geared towards reducing illegal and subversive activities in forested areas 
(Kishor and Rosenbaum 2012:3).
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2.5 Boko Haram insurgency
The term ‘Boko Haram’ literarily translates to ‘western education is 
forbidden’. It refers to the notorious terrorist group based in northeastern 
Nigeria, whose official name is Jama’atu Ahlissunnah Lidda’awatiwal Jihad 
(meaning: people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings 
and Jihad). The Jihadist group was founded in 2002 in Maiduguri, Borno 
State, by a radical Islamist cleric, Mohammed Yusuf. The group’s ideology 
is based on extremist jihadism, with strict observance of Islamic law 
(Sharia) in Nigeria (Okoli and Iortyer 2014:39–40). In the early 2000s, 
the insurgents were active in the greater part of northern Nigeria, almost 
overrunning states like Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa. The intensification of 
counter-insurgency operations of the Nigerian forces and allied civilian 
Joint Task Forces in the 2014/2015 period forced the insurgents to withdraw 
from its city cells and circuits into the Sambisa forest. Since then, the forest 
has become the safe haven and sanctuary for the insurgents. 
3. Theoretical framework: The ‘Ungoverned Spaces’ 
hypothesis
The paper appropriates the ‘ungoverned spaces’ thesis as its theoretical 
compass. This theory is an attempt to highlight the threatening effects 
of ‘under-governed, ill-governed, contested, and exploitable areas’ in 
contemporary state systems (Taylor 2016:2). Stemming from the counter-
terrorism/insurgency cum state-failure discourse of the post-9/11 era, the 
theory posits that ungoverned spaces are ‘areas of limited or anomalous 
governmental control inside otherwise functional states’ (Keister 2014:1) and 
that the prevalence of ungoverned spaces in contemporary states provides 
safe havens for treasonable and subversive activities, often orchestrated by 
organised criminals and extremist groups (Rabasa et al. 2007:1–7).
Although ungoverned spaces are controlled by criminal and subversive 
non-state elements, they are, first and foremost, brought about by the 
state through its functional incapacitation and illegitimacy (Keister 
2014:1). The failure of the state to hold real and firm sway in respect of 
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governance and security has often created ‘governmentality gaps or deficits’ 
(Rabasa et al. 2007), which are exploited by aggrieved, disgruntled, or 
criminally motivated elements to perpetrate violent crime. This is typically 
the case with the instrumentalisation of forests as a strategic resort in 
asymmetric warfare in contemporary Africa.
Through the prism of the ungoverned spaces theory, therefore, it is 
posited herewith that the abusive and criminal use of forests in Africa 
is symptomatic of the state’s fragility syndrome, exemplified by the 
prevalence of ungoverned spaces within the territorial confines of the 
state. So, whilst sundry ungoverned spaces exist and persist, opportunistic 
elements (criminals and insurgents alike) within the civic domain and 
the underworld are inclined to exploit the prevailing ‘faultlines’ towards 
criminal and subversive ends. It is in this sense that the strategic significance 
of forests in relation to insurgency is understood in this study.
4. Forestland and insurgency: A literature review
Extant literature on the relationship between forests and insurgency 
presents us with two important perspectives, namely: (1) that forested 
landscape and resources are exploited by insurgents towards sustaining 
their violence; (2) that insurgency and counter-insurgency operations 
undermine the forests by destroying their ecology and resources 
(Albert 2017). The first perspective refers to the strategic and economic 
importance of forests in the context of insurgency. On the one hand, 
it emphasises the tactical deployment of the forest (for instance, its 
topography, ecology and cover) to gain strategic advantage in the course of 
insurgency. Literature is fraught with instances where the insurgents have 
utilised the difficult terrain of forested areas to advance their guerrilla-
style violence (cf. Berdal and Malone 2000; Fearon and Laitim 2003). 
The other side of the perspective is illicit plundering of forest resources 
by insurgent movements, not only to sustain their cause, but also to make 
some economic gains. This viewpoint is prominent in the ‘resource war’ 
or ‘political/economy of war’ thesis (Atkinson 1997:4). The utilisation of 
forests by insurgents whether as safe havens or as economic resort, affords 
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them with some strategic advantage over conventional troops who are 
involved in counter-insurgency operations. It is in recognition of this fact 
that forests are considered to be one of the most critical environmental 
‘force de-multipliers’ in counter-insurgency campaigns (Albert 2017:2).
The second perspective on the nexus between forests and insurgency 
speaks to the fact that insurgency and counter-insurgency operations 
are detrimental to the forest landscape, resources, and ecosystem (Albert 
2017:1). The combat activities of both insurgents and government troops, 
the bombs, the improvised explosives, the landmines, and of course, the 
wanton exploitation of valuable f lora and fauna in that context, add up to 
the collateral jeopardy of violence for which the ecological integrity of the 
affected forest must dearly pay.
Contemporary scholarship on the relationship between forests and 
insurgency has underscored the significance of forest as an existential 
threat to national and regional security (cf. Landan 2014; Olaniyan and 
Yahaya 2016; Okoli and Ochim 2016; Albert 2017, Olaniyan 2018). The 
dominant argument in these works is that forests are scarcely governed and 
therefore are vulnerable to criminal/terrorist inhabitation and exploitation. 
The necessary implication of this is that effective forest governance should 
be prioritised in national and regional security endeavours. This study 
seeks to make a contribution to this body of discourse by considering the 
contemporary trajectory of the Boko Haram insurgency in the forested 
areas of the Lower Lake Chad Basin.
5. The strategic utility of forest ecology: Uses and abuses
Forest ecology refers to the bio-physical, socio-ecological, topological and 
vegetational characteristics of the forest as an organic entity (Okoli and 
Ochim 2016:43–47). The strategic utility of forest ecology refers to the uses 
and abuses of the forested environment for specific purposes in various 
contexts. This underlines the understanding that forest ecology could be 
appropriated or misappropriated for some ecological, socio-economic, 
tactical (military), criminal, or scientific purposes.
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Generally, a forest holds both beneficial and nuisance values, depending on 
the nature and motive of its exploitation. The beneficial value of the forest 
has to do with the legitimate economic and socio-ecological exploitation 
of forest resources and endowments. This includes hunting and gathering, 
ecological conservation, eco-tourism, scientific research, and military 
trainings/simulation. On the other hand, the nuisance value of the forest 
refers to the untoward use of the forested environment by criminals, 
insurgents, and terrorists towards advancing their nefarious activities.
The instrumentalisation of the forest as a means of furthering organised 
crime has been well documented in the extant literature (Ladan 2014:120; 
Olaniyan 2018:1). A case in point is the use of forests as safe havens by 
rural bandits in West Africa, who indulge in cattle rustling, kidnapping 
and arms snuggling (Olaniyan and Yahaya 2016:93; Okoli and Ochim 
2016:47–48). In addition to criminal violence, forests have been used by 
terrorists and/or insurgents in various parts of the world as sanctuaries 
for the plotting and prosecution of political violence. The ‘forest wars’ 
in places like Cambodia, Burma, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone provide abundant examples of this tendency 
(cf. Albert 2017; Olaniyan 2018).
The Niger Delta militants, prior to the 2008/2009 Amnesty deal, capitalised 
on the strategic cover provided by the littoral jungles and creeks of the 
region to wage sustained war against the Nigerian state. The difficult 
nature of the regional forests conferred on the militants some degree of 
strategic advantage over the government troops, who were not sufficiently 
conversant with the terrain (Okoli 2016). Besides, the forests also afforded 
the militants with a ‘political economy of war’ (Atkinson 1997:4–5) by 
providing them with an enabling environment for the exploitation and 
expropriation of petroleum resources through oil theft and artisanal 
refining (Okoli 2016). This opportunistic strategy boosted the operational 
efficacy and sustainability of the Niger Delta militancy in the focal era. 
Such a strategy has since been perfected by the Boko Haram insurgents 
who capitalise on their stranglehold on the Sambisa forest to sustain its 
operations through cattle rustling, hostage taking, and arms smuggling.
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6. Overview of the setting of the study: Lower/Lake Chad 
Basin and Sambisa forest
This study has its locus as the lower Lake Chad Basin. Within this 
geographical remit, the study focuses on the activities of Boko Haram 
fighters in the Sambisa forests in the context of the ongoing insurgency and 
counter-insurgency in the area. The Lake Chad Basin is located in northern 
Central Africa. It covers about 8% of Africa’s land mass, spreading over 
seven countries (Table 1).
Table 1: Lake Chad Basin: Areas and rainfall by country




Area of the 
country  
within  
the basin  
(km2)




As % of  
total area  
of country 
(%)
Average annual rainfall 
in the basin area
(mm)
Min. Max. Mean
Nigeria 923770 179282 7.5 19.4 285 1330 670
Niger 1267000 691473 29.0 54.6 0 635 105
Algeria 2381740 93451 3.9 3.9 0 135 20
Sudan 2505810 101048 4.2 4.0 70 1155 585
Central 
Africa
622980 219410 9.2 35.2 760 1535 1215
Chad 1284000 1046196 43.9 81.5 0 1350 400
Cameroon 475440 50775 2.1 10.7 365 1590 1010
For Lake 
Chad basin
2381635 100.0 0 1590 415
Source: FAO 1997: Chapter 6
The seven countries indicated in Table 1 are categorised into two: core and 
periphery. The core countries of the basin constitute the four countries 
that have direct contact with Lake Chad while the peripheral countries are 
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those that do not. The former are also referred to as the conventional Lake 
Chad Basin in that they are the official members of the Lake Chad Basin 
Commission. This covers about 20% of the total area of the Lake Chad 
basin (42 7500 km2) (42% in Chad, 28% in Niger, 21% in Nigeria and 9% 
in Cameroon (FAO 1997:Chapter 6).
The core Lake Chad Basin is sub-divided into the Upper and Lower axis. 
The Upper axis refers to Chad and Niger Republic while the Lower basin 
includes Cameroon and Nigeria (see figure 1). This study focuses on the 
Lower Basin, which has been most affected by the on-going insurgency 
in northeast Nigeria and its cognate Lake Chad neighbours. The Sambisa 
forest, which has been a critical factor in the insurgency and counter-
insurgency operations in the region, is located in this area.
The Sambisa forest is located between the northeastern axis of the west Sudanese 
Savanna and the southern boundary of the Sahel Acacia Savanna (BirdLife 
2015). The location of the forest is about 60 km southeast of Maiduguri, 
the capital of Borno State in Nigeria (Kayode 2014a). It stretches northwards 
across the States of Borno, Yobe, Gombe, Bauchi and Jigawa, up to parts 
of Kano (Kayode 2014a; 2014b). Sambisa forest derives its name from the 
village of Sambisa which is on the borderlines of Gwoza in the eastern 
part of Borno State. The Gwoza hills have peaks of 1300 meters above sea 
level. The hills form part of the Mandara Mountain range, situated along 
the Cameroon-Nigeria border (Kayode 2014a). The forest is drained by 
seasonal streams into the Yedseram and the Ngadda Rivers (Mbaya and 
Malgwi 2010:135).
The Sambisa forest has been crucial to the economy and strategy of 
Boko Haram insurgents. The insurgents have occupied the Forest since 
the late 2000s. The exigencies of insurgency and counter-insurgency 
have transformed the Forest into a highly militarised, ‘weaponised’ and 
securitised zone (Okoli and Ochim 2016:47–48). In effect, it has been 
exploited by the Boko Haram insurgents as an operational base as well as a 
strategic sanctuary. It has also played a vital role in sustaining the political 
economy of insurgency by providing an enabling environment for war-time 
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criminal franchise, such as cattle rustling, illegal lumbering, hostage-
taking/kidnapping and arms smuggling (Okoli 2017b:1; Olaniyan 2018:1).
Figure 1: Map of Lake Chad and its surrounding countries, 
showing Sambisa forest in the centre
Source: Creative Commons
7. Sambisa forest: Occupation and exploitation by  
Boko Haram
The Sambisa forest constitutes the bastion of Boko Haram insurgency. 
The strategic symbolism of the forest is such that it evokes phobia and 
mystery, signifying the territorial dimension of Nigeria’s national security 
Sambisa forest
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debacle at the present. The Sambisa forest has been the physical and virtual 
headquarters of Boko Haram insurgency. According to Albert (2017:13): 
Sambisa forest provides the insurgents with a space for organizing their 
prayer sessions, interrogating and executing abductees, producing their 
media instruments and doing their military trainings. They take all seized 
weapons and vehicles there. It is their operational headquarters.
The Sambisa forest hosts the organisational, operational, logistical and 
technical infrastructure of Boko Haram, including its command, armoury, 
training, detention and execution camps, landmines, artisanal bomb-
making factories, prayer grounds, military and civilian supplies, loots, 
and livestock. It is also the destination for the insurgents’ prisoners of war, 
including abductees, sex slaves, and those kidnapped for ransom.
The Sambisa forest came into international recognition in 2014, following 
the mass abduction of the Chibok School Girls, who were then taken to the 
forest for custody. As a concequence of this incident, the forest has been a 
critical theatre of counter-insurgency operations by the Nigerian troops 
and their international support forces. In spite of the significant successes 
made by the Nigerian armed forces in gaining entrance and reclaiming the 
Sambisa forest between 2015 and the present, some aspects of the forest are 
still under firm control of the insurgents.
The Nigerian troops have often encountered operational setbacks in their 
bid to dislodge the insurgents from the Sambisa forest. The challenges 
naturally emanate from the vast nature of the forest as well as its virtual 
ungovernability. The size of the Sambisa forest has been likened to that 
of Lagos Sate in South West Nigeria. In addition to its expansive nature, 
the forest is located along an equally expansive international frontier, 
characterised by porous and poorly policed borderlines (Okoli 2017a). 
This has made it possible for the insurgents to manoeuver along the porous 
and defective borders and readily reinforce their position.
Another challenge is that the forest has been heavily weaponised and 
fortified over the years. Clear indicators of this trend include the presence 
of combat-ready terrorists, suicide bombers, landmines and human shields. 
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Coupled with the availability of sophisticated weaponry as well as the 
insurgents’ brutal efficiency in the theatre of combat, the highly militarised 
and weaponised Sambisa forest has so far proven a hard nut for the troops 
involved in counter-insurgency operations.
The insurgents’ occupation of the Sambisa forest has has been accompanied 
by corresponding exploitation of the terrain (see table 2). In effect, the 
forest has doubled as the base for sundry illicit franchises, including cattle 
rustling, illegal mining, lumbering and arms trafficking. These activities 
support the economy of insurgency by providing funding and material 
sustenance to it (Okoli 2017b). The criminal exploitation of Sambisa forest 
by insurgents has been facilitated by their relative familiarity with and 
mastery of the ecology of the forest. This is in view of the fact that a good 
number of the commanders and foot-soldiers of the insurgent movement 
appear to have come from the region.
For more than a decade now, Boko Haram insurgents have maintained their 
strategic stranglehold on Sambisa forest, exploiting its strategic terrain 
and resources for sustaining its campaign of terror. Beyond this ultimate 
end, the insurgents have also effectively utilised the forest as a vantage site 
for media production dedicated to propaganda, ideological warfare and 
radicalisation. By so doing, they have been able to sustain an appreciable 
level of international visibility and propaganda.
It is pertinent to reiterate that, in comparison with other areas, Sambisa 
forest is the most strategically auspicious base for the pattern of 
asymmetric guerrilla warfare and jihadist occupation, used by the Boko 
Haram insurgency. It is extremely sparse and expansive, and therefore 
very problematic to govern. It is also located within a trans-territorial area 
characterised by porosity of borders. It is, furthermore, generally bereft 
of settled civil and military inhabitation. Most importantly, its physical 
topography, comprising woodlands interspersed by hills, rocks, waters 
and jungles, is amenable to asymmetric manoeuvrability.
51
Boko Haram insurgency and forestland governance
Table 2: Dimensions of Boko Haram’s activities in the  
Sambisa forest
Domain of Activity Empirical Indicators
Subsistence Cultivation and storage of food; rearing of animals;  
extraction of wood for fuel; gathering of fruits and hunting  
of wild animals
Strategy Operational/tactical base for combat training, planning, 
camping, torture and execution, holding of prisoners of war 
and abductees, manufacturing and testing of improvised 
explosives
Economy Safe space for smuggling, cattle rustling, illicit logging, 
charcoal milling, mining and quarrying
Source: Author’s compilation.
8. Governing Sambisa forest: The imperative for a trans-
territorial approach
Boko Haram poses a trans-national threat within the wider Lake Chad 
Basin. The group has launched a couple of attacks in Nigeria, Chad and 
Cameroon. Given its nascent affiliation with ISIS (Islamic State in Syria), 
it is apparent that the operational scope of the group will expand. The same 
is also true of the group’s asymmetric opportunism. The porous nature of 
the borderlines as well as the forested landscape in the Lake Chad region 
has afforded the insurgents with the opportunity of trans-border tactical 
manoeuvrability. In this regard, Albert (2017:12) observes that ‘When 
Boko Haram attacks any Nigerian community, it would simply “dive” into 
the forest for cover and emerge in any of the Lake Chad Basin countries 
that interests it and that is the end of the operation’.
Within the lower Lake Chad Basin, the transnational threat of Boko 
Haram insurgency has been most immanent and palpable. Cattle rustled 
in northeastern Nigeria have often crossed into Cameroon via the fringes 
of Sambisa forest (Okoli 2017b). Similarly, Boko Haram fighters have 
oftentimes engaged Nigerian troops in a hit-and-run combat along the 
northward Nigeria-Cameroon borderlines (Okoli 2017a). The exigencies 
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of counter-insurgency in the Lake Chad region have necessitated and 
recommended the adoption of a multinational approach towards finding 
a lasting solution to the prevailing threat. This is expedient because the 
threat has transcended national boundaries and has assumed a sub-
regional dynamics (common threat). More so, it has persistently exploited 
the faultlines of the virtual porosity and ungovernability of Nigeria’s 
northward borderlands. More importantly, the threat has overwhelmed 
the defence capacity and strategy of Nigeria; hence the need for a 
transnational strategy that leverages tactical synergy unencumbered by 
territorial considerations.
So far, Nigeria and Cameroon have been tactically cooperating in terms of 
military reconnaissance in an attempt to police and guard their common 
borderlines that stretch from the Bight of Biafra in the southeastern 
axis through the Mambila Plateau in the middle-belt region to the Lake 
Chad area in the far north corridor. The military cooperation has taken 
the form of bilateral and multilateral engagements designed to respond 
to the exigencies of Boko Haram insurgency. For instance, Nigeria and 
Cameroon are frontline members of the sub-regional Multinational 
(Military) Taskforce, comprised of special emergency fighters from the 
member states of the core Lake Chad Basin that are dedicated to counter-
insurgency in the region (Okoli 2017a). Such engagements have been very 
challenging both logistically and tactically. The challenge arises from 
encumbrances of territoriality and sovereignty which often inhibit troops 
of both countries from engaging in cross-border combat operations. 
Going forward, meaningful remediation must begin with fashioning a 
systematic means of vacating the circumstantial security encumbrances 
posed by the notorious Sambisa forest. In the light of the foregoing, this 
paper makes a case for a trans-territorial forest governance framework 
whereby the authorities of Nigeria and Cameroon synergise in ensuring 
military and civil reclamation of the Sambisa corridor through effective 
occupation. To this end, it is recommended that the governments of 
Nigeria and Cameroon should institute both functional and territorial 
mechanisms dedicated to the security and development of their common 
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forested frontiers on the lower Lake Chad axis. The security component 
of the initiative should prioritise aspects of rangeland policing, with 
emphasis on joint armed reconnaissance, intelligence sharing, rangeland 
surveillance and patrol, as well as intensive combatant operations. On the 
other hand, the development component should emphasise endeavours 
to effectively reclaim the vast and volatile trans-border forestlands 
through elaborate ecological conservation, agricultural extension, as well 
as strategic civilian and military occupation. The expected result of the 
process is to entrench a territorial control through effective and proper 
civil-cum-military inhabitation of the erstwhile ‘ungoverned spaces’ in 
a manner that forecloses its virtual ungovernability. In a nutshell, there 
is a need for a Nigeria-Cameroon emergency cross-border governance 
regime that prioritises joint rangeland security and development as well 
as incremental civil and military occupation of the Sambisa corridor 
through phased functional developmental projects in areas such as agro-
settlement, military industrial complex, eco-tourism, and the like. 
The above recommendation could be situated within the domain of 
emergency trans-border governance/security regimen which has been 
adverted to in the extant literature. For instance, in a study carried out on 
the Lake Constance Region and the Upper-Rhine Region in continental 
Europe, Zumbusch and Scherer (2015:500–520) reveal how the exigencies 
of cross-border cooperation in that context informed a governance 
system that transcended the imperative of territoriality. Such was a trans-
territorial cross-border regimen that sought to balance the concerns of 
‘formalized and less formalized co-operations’ in an effort to assure 
an effective frontier development and security (Zumbusch and Scherer 
2015:500). Elsewhere, in a study on ‘cross-border territorial strategy’ in 
‘Greater Region’ of Europe, Decovillea and Durand (2016:66) highlight 
the need for the institutionalisation of functional development initiatives 
as a means of dealing with the territorial impediments to sustainable 
cross-border governance and, ultimately, integration. These scholarly 
observations point out that emergency situations in this context do 
impose a necessity for cross-border governance which would be borne best 
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by way of a trans-territorial framework. This is the option before Nigeria 
and Cameroon in the face of their common terror-related territorial threat, 
especially within the forested landscapes of the Lower Lake Chad region.
9. Conclusion 
Insurgency is an unconventional, opportunistic warfare. It thrives by 
tactical opportunism through the exploitation of difficult or scarcely 
governed spaces in order to gain a strategic, asymmetric advantage. 
In Africa, insurgent groups have often utilised difficult terrains, such 
as mountains, creeks, deserts, and jungles as safe havens or sanctuaries. 
The difficult nature of these terrains affords the insurgents with an 
enormous strategic operational advantage vis-à-vis the conventional forces. 
It also inhibits the efficacy of counter-insurgency operations by national or 
regional authorities.
The Boko Haram insurgency in northeast Nigeria has followed the logic 
of tactical opportunism. It has sustained itself through a firm occupation 
and exploitation of the Sambisa forest in the lower Lake Chad Basin. 
The Sambisa, apart from providing territorial cover and shield for the 
bulk of Boko Haram activities, serves as a fountain of ‘political economy’ 
for armed conf lict in that context. The strategic importance of the forest 
is that while it has boosted the activities of the insurgents, it has at the 
same time encumbered the operational efficacy of the counter-insurgency 
endeavours of the Nigerian government and its regional allies. In view of 
its strategic significance in the context of the on-going insurgency and 
counter-insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin, the Sambisa forest poses a 
virtual existential threat to member-states of the region, particularly those 
on the lower belt (Nigeria and Cameroon). The trans-border character of 
this threat requires a corresponding trans-territorial forest governance 
strategy whereby the affected countries would synergise on an enduring 
basis towards finding a lasting solution to the common threat.
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